That is the theme of my latest Bloomberg column, note that the idea would to some extent cut private banks out of the intermediation equation. Here is one excerpt:
An alternative scenario is that the central bank decides to enter the commercial lending business, much as your current bank does. Will the central bank be a better lender than the private banks? Probably not. Central banks are conservative by nature, and have few “roots in the community” as the phrase is commonly understood. The end result would be more funds used to buy Treasury bonds and mortgage securities — highly institutionalized investments — and fewer loans to small and mid-sized local businesses.
The problems run deeper yet. Financial regulation makes a relatively tight distinction between banks and non-banks. Banks have access to the payments system directly and enjoy other privileges, and in return their risk-taking is regulated more heavily (by not only the Fed but also other federal agencies and states). A fintech startup, in contrast, avoids most bank regulations, but it must work through banks to make payments. This division of responsibilities is imperfect, but it has allowed many parts of the U.S. economy to grow and innovate without facing all of the regulations imposed on banks.
This leads to my primary objection to an official government e-currency: It would, in effect, make many more economic institutions more like banks. Over time, those institutions would probably be regulated more like banks, too. For instance, if the Fed is directly transmitting payments made by a private company, it might be wary of credit risk and impose capital and reserve requirements on that company, much as it does on banks. Banks also might complain that they are facing unfair competition, and ask that consistent regulations be imposed. In any case, more of the economy likely will be subject to financial regulation, not just the relatively narrow core of the banking system.
Not all innovation is good innovation.